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Introduction
WE ARE FREQUENTLY ASKED to provide information about our-
selves. Commercial transactions, medical care, and travel cannot be
accomplished without providing a wealth of personal information. But
these are chosen encounters. Change the backdrop to a courtroom
where voir dire is occurring. Prospective jurors are peppered with de-
mands for information such as their name, address, place of employ-
ment, and family members’ names. Being in an unfamiliar setting and
having the imprimatur of a judge, they acquiesce.
The right to decline answering personal questions is rarely
broached by prospective jurors. Courts, on the other hand, have con-
sidered prohibiting disclosure of juror information. They cite juror
privacy and safety as reasons to withhold a juror’s name, address, and
place of employment in criminal trials. But these grounds warrant
scrutiny. In the information age, the notion of privacy is becoming
increasingly tenuous. The ubiquity of social networking websites dem-
onstrates the popularity of divulging personal information. While ju-
ror safety is a legitimate concern, juror information is seldom used for
nefarious purposes. It is questionable whether the mere invocation of
security suffices to make a jury anonymous.
The definition of “anonymous jury” is a shifting one. While the
information kept secret differs by jurisdiction, name, address, tele-
phone number, and place of employment are typically not disclosed.
From whom the information is withheld also varies. Juror data can be
permanently secreted from everyone, given only to counsel, or given
only to the parties. These variations highlight the competing interests
underlying anonymous juries. Anonymity implicates the First Amend-
ment freedom of the press, the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial,
and juror safety. While views on anonymity vary, one point is indispu-
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table: the increasing use of anonymous juries.1 Although anonymous
juries have been de rigueur in cases of national prominence, their use
in routine matters is a recent trend.
Over the last thirty years, the jury has undergone changes. The
twelve person requirement is no longer.2 Unanimity is not necessary.3
Anonymity is the latest transformation. But unlike other alterations,
anonymity is transpiring with neither Supreme Court consideration
nor social science analysis. Thus, how anonymity impacts juror deci-
sion making has not been ascertained. Whether it affects a juror’s im-
partiality in the criminal context is not an esoteric question. The state
may not create trial conditions adversely affecting jurors’ perception
of a defendant.4 But if jurors conflate anonymity with a criminal de-
fendant’s dangerousness, the right to a fair trial is eviscerated.
This Article first reviews the origins, history, and use of juries,
traditional and anonymous. It then evaluates the benefits and draw-
backs of anonymous juries. It concludes with an examination of the
psychological aspects of juror anonymity. Anonymity is a multifaceted
issue raising difficult questions. But hard choices cannot excuse the
unpleasant reality that anonymity undermines the presumption of in-
nocence. The right to a fair trial is also eroded because anonymity
diminishes the transparency of the process. Courts should thus curtail
the use of anonymous juries.
1. Almost every federal circuit permits anonymous juries. See United States v. Deitz,
577 F.3d 672, 685 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir.
2007); United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 971–72 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 649 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 31 (1st
Cir. 1998); United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam);
United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1426 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d
1507, 1532 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994).
2. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (permitting federal civil trials with
juries of six individuals); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (permitting a jury of less
than twelve individuals).
3. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (holding non-unanimous jury verdicts
in state court criminal cases are constitutional).
4. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (noting in order to implement the
presumption of innocence, trial courts must be aware of factors that undermine the fair-
ness of fact-finding procedures).
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I. Background of Juries
A. The History of the Jury
Juries have ancient origins. Historians have unearthed references
to juries in the Roman Empire, Greece, Egypt, and the Viking era.5
While the role of juries has changed over time, the core concept has
endured. By the time the jury reached England, every major civiliza-
tion had utilized it. England’s use of the jury dates to the inception of
the common law.6 Early English juries were administrative in nature.7
This changed in 1154 when King Henry II enacted the assizes and
made the jury a recognized instrument of justice.8 Juries were used
infrequently until 1219, when Pope Innocent III proscribed trials by
ordeal.9 This left trial by jury as the method to resolve criminal cases,
and juries soon became a fixture of the English system.10
The sine qua non of English juries was that jurors knew the parties
or the facts.11 Jurors were selected because of who they were or what
they knew.12 English jurors were publicly selected, and this ensured
that jurors came from the village in which the dispute arose.13 The
intimacy of such communities guaranteed litigants could identify the
jurors.14
English colonists imported the jury to the New World, and it
quickly became the favored dispute resolution technique.15 The jury’s
popularity stemmed from its utility as a bulwark against oppression
5. Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspec-
tive, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 814 (1997).
6. See generally WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (2d ed. 1875) (analyzing
the history of jury trials throughout the world); MAXIMUS A. LESSER, THE HISTORICAL DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM (1894) (discussing the history of the English jury).
7. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 582 (1993).
8. Id. at 583.
9. THEODORE PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 118 (Lawbook
Exch. 5th ed. 2001) (1929).
10. Landsman, supra note 7, at 584.
11. Commonwealth v. DuPont, No. 85-981-987, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 476, at *16
(Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 1998); see also Jerry Pope, The Jury, 39 TEX. L. REV. 426, 431 n.27
(1961) (noting that sometimes a sworn inquest of neighbors was used to serve as jurors);
James B. Thayer, The Older Modes of Trial, 5 HARV. L. REV. 45, 45 (1891) (stating jurors were
most likely neighbors).
12. Pope, supra note 11, at 438–39.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussing juries
of vicinage where everyone knew empanelled jurors); Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735,
755–77 (Del. 1990) (outlining the history of public access to juror identification).
15. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 288
(1999).
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from the crown.16 This acceptance remained following the Revolu-
tionary War. The right to a jury trial was so revered that the Founders
enshrined it in the Constitution.17 The Sixth Amendment was ratified
in 1791, giving criminal defendants “the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury.”18 Hundreds of years later, the jury is the
crown jewel of the American judicial system.
Considering the jury’s roots, jurors who were not only unknown
but had their identities hidden would have been anathema to the col-
onists.19 Even thirty years ago, the notion would have been dubious.
But anonymity has crept into American jurisprudence.
B. The Origins of Anonymous Juries
While juries are thousands of years old, anonymous juries date
back thirty years. The fountainhead of anonymous juries was the 1977
case of United States v. Barnes.20 Leroy Barnes was tried with fourteen
co-defendants on a myriad of charges including conspiracy, drug pos-
session, and weapons possession.21 But Barnes was not just another
drug dealer. He controlled the flow of heroin into New York, and his
power was surpassed only by his fortune.22 But Barnes’ notoriety pre-
cipitated his downfall.
The trial occurred in the Southern District of New York. Before
voir dire, Judge Werker decided sua sponte to impanel an anonymous
jury.23 In doing so, the court refused inquiry into the venire persons’
identities, neighborhoods, and ethnic backgrounds.24 This was the
16. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The trials of all Crimes, except in Cases of Im-
peachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed. . . .”). The right to trial by jury in civil cases was incorporated
into the Constitution in the Seventh Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
18. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
19. But see Kory A. Langhofer, Comment, Unaccountable at the Founding: The Originalist
Case for Anonymous Juries, 115 YALE L.J. 1823 (2006) (contending no Founding-era evidence
opposes anonymity).
20. 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979). The practice of limiting juror information began in
Johnson v. United States, 270 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1959), when the Ninth Circuit ruled that
jurors’ addresses could be withheld.
21. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 130–31.
22. See generally LEROY BARNES, MR. UNTOUCHABLE: MY CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
(2007) (describing Barnes’ rise to power as a heroin kingpin and his subsequent arrest and
conviction).
23. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 133.
24. Id. at 135.
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first time such a jury had been impaneled.25 More remarkable than
the paucity of legal precedent was the lack of a factual basis. The pros-
ecution had not alleged jury tampering.26 Nor did the court solicit the
parties’ views. Every time the defendants sought to challenge the rul-
ing “their requests were sharply denied.”27 The trial proceeded before
an anonymous jury, and eleven of the fifteen defendants were found
guilty.28 Barnes’ conviction on the charge of continuing criminal en-
terprise earned him a life sentence.29
The defendants appealed, arguing the anonymous jury infringed
on the voir dire process.30 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit disagreed.31 It determined voir dire was not impeded because
anonymity relieved pressure on jurors and protected impartiality.32
The court recognized the need for sufficient information to formulate
juror challenges, but determined venire persons’ responses to ques-
tions were enough.33 The court observed that disclosure of identities
“is not the law and should not be” and concluded anonymity allevi-
ated jurors’ fears of retaliation.34
Judge Meskill dissented. He was “troubled by the implications of
today’s decision and the uses to which it may be put.”35 Secreting
names was not problematic, it was that they were withheld with other
juror information.36 Meskill’s concerns were twofold. First, anonymity
infringed on the constitutional right to an impartial jury because par-
ties could not guarantee impartiality.37 Second, peremptory chal-
lenges were undermined because anonymity prevented “the full,
25. See Ephraim Margolin & Gerald F. Uelmen, The Anonymous Jury: Jury Tampering by
Another Name, 9 CRIM. JUST. 14, 14 (1994) (noting that “jury anonymity was unknown to
common law and to American jurisprudence in its first two centuries”); David Weinstein,
Protecting a Juror’s Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L.
REV. 1, 25 (1997) (stating the impaneling of anonymous juries was extremely uncommon
before Barnes).
26. Abraham Abramovsky, Juror Safety: The Presumption of Innocence and Meaningful Voir
Dire in Federal Criminal Prosecutions—Are They Endangered Species?, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 30, 35
(1981).
27. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 169 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 133 (majority opinion).
29. Id. at 156.
30. Id. at 133.
31. Id. at 142–43.
32. Id. at 140–41.
33. Id. at 142.
34. Id. at 140–41.
35. Id. at 168 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 173.
37. Id. at 170–74.
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unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right . . . .”38 The Second
Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc. This denial
prompted further rebuke from Judge Oakes who proclaimed other
courts would follow the decision like “a flock of sea gulls follows a
lobster boat.”39 The U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for writ
of certiorari, solidifying the use of anonymous juries.40
Thirty years after the trial, Leroy Barnes wrote an intriguing post-
script. His 2007 book, Mr. Untouchable, is an unabashed account of his
life.41 Barnes discusses his crimes, trials, jail stints, and the witness pro-
tection program. Barnes admits his penchant for bribing jurors, and
his 1977 trial was no different. In that regard, Judge Werker’s anonym-
ity ruling can be vindicated. But more remarkable than Barnes’ admis-
sion that he bribed a juror is that the first anonymous jury was not
anonymous. After jury selection the defendants went to lunch, lament-
ing the “unfriendly” jury.42 But Guy Fisher, a co-defendant and confi-
dant of Barnes, was relishing the selection of an acquaintance.43 The
defendants agreed for Fisher to contact the juror’s family.44 Fisher re-
layed the results of his efforts the next day—the juror wanted
$75,000.45 The defendants agreed a not guilty vote for each defendant
was worth that price. Barnes was happy, “[e]ven if we couldn’t get a
full acquittal, at least we’d fixed the lottery to ensure a hung jury.”46
Barnes’ gambit failed. The jury found him guilty along with ten of
his co-defendants. One of the four defendants not found guilty was
Guy Fisher.47 The jury’s failure to reach a verdict on Fisher would not
raise Barnes’ suspicion until later. Barnes had more pressing con-
cerns, life imprisonment. Languishing in a federal penitentiary,
Barnes eventually began talking with federal authorities. During these
discussions Barnes learned that Fisher told the juror to vote not guilty
only for himself.48 Fisher was the only defendant for whom the jury
38. Id. at 170 (citing Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
39. Id. at 175 (denial of rehearing en banc).
40. United States v. Barnes, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
41. BARNES, supra note 22.
42. Id. at 127–28.
43. Id. at 128.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 1979).
48. BARNES, supra note 22, at 264. Fisher’s actions were discussed in a later Second
Circuit opinion in which Fisher’s racketeering conviction was affirmed. United States v.
Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1362–63 (2d Cir. 1985).
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failed to reach a verdict.49 Fisher’s betrayal drove Barnes to turn
state’s evidence, ensuring his erstwhile partners prison time and him-
self freedom.
While the backstory of Barnes is fascinating, the legal implications
of the district court’s ruling would prove more profound. Despite this
inauspicious birth, the anonymous jury has led a robust life. Judge
Oakes’ remark in the denial of en banc was prescient, Barnes has been
the inducement for other jurisdictions to use anonymous juries.
C. Anonymity Spreads
The immediate impact of Barnes was negligible. Anonymous ju-
ries were limited to federal districts in New York.50 While acceptance
in other jurisdictions was sporadic during the 1980s, the floodgates
opened in the 1990s. Anonymity gained traction as additional courts
embraced it. “[I]n the space of twenty short years, nameless juries
have progressed from a judicial fluke to a well established departure
from ordinary procedure . . . .”51 This spate transpired without a word
from the U.S. Supreme Court. How federal courts handle anonymity
is examined next, followed by state courts.
1. Anonymous Juries in Federal Courts
“Drastic.”52 “Extreme.”53 “Extraordinary.”54 These are some of
the adjectives federal courts use to describe anonymous juries. But
such skepticism has not stopped virtually every federal circuit from
using them. Anonymity has created a paradox—courts shun the idea
but accept the practice.
a. The Standards for Anonymity
While anonymous juries are becoming more common, they are
not yet routine. Nor are they implemented on a whim. Courts require
evidence that anonymity is warranted. An example of this analysis is
United States v. Thomas.55 A byproduct of the Barnes litigation, the
Thomas defendants were alleged to have committed “mob-style” kill-
49. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 131.
50. Eric Wertheim, Note, Anonymous Juries, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 982 n.8 (1986).
51. Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Anonymous Juries: In Exigent Circum-
stances Only, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 457, 465 (1999).
52. United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1034 (11th Cir. 2005).
53. United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 650 (7th Cir. 2002).
54. United States v. Calabrese, 515 F. Supp. 2d 880, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
55. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).
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ings and interfered with the judicial process, including the 1977 trial
of Leroy Barnes.56 The district court impaneled an anonymous jury
for the Thomas trial. As in Barnes, the defendants argued anonymity
infringed on the presumption of innocence because it suggested they
were dangerous.57 As in Barnes, these arguments failed. The Second
Circuit determined the protection of jurors trumped the presumption
of innocence if two factors were met.58 First, the trial court finds a
“strong reason to believe the jury needs protection.”59 Second, the
trial court takes reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial
effects of anonymity on the defendant.60 The Second Circuit’s ap-
proach has formed the nucleus of other circuits’ tests.
The analysis articulated in Thomas has been expanded. Justifica-
tions for juror protection include: (1) the defendant’s involvement in
organized crime; (2) the defendant’s participation in a group with the
capacity to harm jurors; (3) the defendant’s past attempts to interfere
with the judicial process; (4) the potential of a lengthy incarceration;
or (5) extensive media publicity.61 Satisfying one of these factors trig-
gers the process of impaneling an anonymous jury. While the proce-
dure varies by jurisdiction, the following depiction is typical. The
information withheld from the parties entails the venire person’s
name, address, phone number, and place of employment. The court
assigns a number to each venire person.62 Any reference to a venire
person is made according to her number.63
Statutory authority also provides for jurors’ names to be kept con-
fidential—at least to the public. Federal district courts have discretion
to determine if the names of jurors are made public pursuant to the
Jury Selection and Service Act.64 The statute provides:
The names drawn from the qualified jury wheel shall be disclosed
to parties and to the public. If the plan permits these names to be
made public, it may nevertheless permit the chief judge of the dis-
trict court, or such other district court judge as the plan may pro-
56. Id. at 1364.
57. Id. at 1363–64; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, United States v. Fisher, 474 U.S. 819 (1985) (No. 84-1778), 1985
WL 695265, at *14.
58. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1365.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 356 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
62. G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN ET AL., JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 81 (1997).
63. Id. at 82.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (2006).
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vide, to keep these names confidential in any case where the
interests of justice so require.65
Some courts prohibit disclosure unless by order. Others grant access
unless the “interests of justice” demand otherwise.66
Federal appellate courts review a district court’s decision to use
an anonymous jury under an abuse of discretion standard.67 Because
anonymity falls under the rubric of “trial administration,” abuse of dis-
cretion is used. There is only one instance, discussed below, in which a
district court was reversed for impaneling an anonymous jury. This
reversal rate notwithstanding, appellate courts are not enamored with
anonymity. The Fifth Circuit noted the procedure is a device of last
resort “which should be undertaken only in limited and carefully de-
lineated circumstances.”68 The First Circuit explained that “the pros-
pect of criminal justice being routinely meted out by unknown
persons does not comport with democratic values of accountability
and openness.”69 But actions speak louder than words.
b. Challenging Anonymity in Federal Courts
The only instance of a federal appellate court reversing because
of anonymity is United States v. Sanchez.70 The defendant was a police
officer accused of forcing women to engage in sex acts.71 The court
withheld the jurors’ names, addresses, employers, and family mem-
bers’ names.72 The defendant appealed the use of anonymity. The
Fifth Circuit noted the defendant was not involved in organized crime
and did not participate in a group that might harm jurors. No evi-
dence of interference with the judicial process existed.73 The Fifth
Circuit concluded that actual evidence, not speculation, was needed
for an anonymous jury.74 The court further held the harmless error
rule did not apply to anonymity except in limited circumstances. The
court concluded a defendant “should receive a verdict, not from
anonymous decision makers, but from people he can name as respon-
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2007).
68. United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir. 1994)).
69. In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 98 (1st Cir. 1990).
70. 74 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 1996).
71. Id. at 563.
72. Id. at 564–65.
73. Id. at 565.
74. Id.
540 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
sible for their actions.”75 Unfortunately for defendants, Sanchez is an
anomaly.
While Sanchez scrutinized the application of the anonymity fac-
tors, it did not question the factors themselves. In fact, most courts
have adopted these factors without fanfare. This is troubling because
three of the justifications for anonymity are dubious. Two factors, a
defendant’s involvement in organized crime and his capacity to harm
jurors, put the cart before the horse. Whether the defendant is in-
volved with nefarious groups is an issue for the jury. These factors
amount to trying the defendant before the trial begins. Another ques-
tionable justification is the potential for a lengthy incarceration. The
federal docket is bursting with cases in which a defendant faces seri-
ous prison time. If this factor was applied literally, then a significant
portion of cases would be tried by anonymous juries.
The gravity of anonymity demands greater scrutiny from the fed-
eral bench. Courts acknowledge that a practice burdening the pre-
sumption of innocence calls for “close judicial scrutiny.”76 The ritual
acceptance of anonymity, facilitated by a deferential standard of re-
view, belies this instruction. “Close judicial scrutiny” suggests in-
creased sensitivity to potential problems, including the psychological
implications of anonymity. This has not been the case. While federal
appellate courts discourage anonymity, they will not prohibit it. Only
in state courts can critics of anonymity find solace.
2. Anonymous Juries in State Courts
At first blush, anonymity in the state realm mirrors the federal.
State courts consider the same factors for empanelling an anonymous
jury. But the systems diverge at two points. First, anonymity is used
more often in state courts. Second, state courts have voiced more stri-
dent criticism of anonymity.
Many states permit anonymous juries via statute.77 Some jurisdic-
tions have expanded the practice beyond those instances where ju-
rors’ safety is implicated.78 Virginia and Maryland are considering
75. Id.
76. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1363 (2d Cir. 1985).
77. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 237 (West 2006) (allowing juror information to
be sealed in criminal cases and making it a misdemeanor to improperly obtain or release
sealed juror information); 10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4513(a) (1999) (granting discretion
to trial court in whether to release jurors’ names); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-32 (2008)
(granting trial court discretion to keep jurors’ names confidential).
78. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 51, at 464–65.
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anonymity for all criminal cases.79 The Virginia General Assembly en-
acted a law in 2008 that required courts to find “good cause” for se-
crecy before hiding the identities of jurors.80 The law directed the
Virginia Supreme Court to issue rules for its implementation.81 The
Advisory Committee on Rules of the Supreme Court then issued pro-
posed rule 3A:14.1, which would make all jurors anonymous.82 Thus,
all criminal jurors in Virginia would be assigned a number and “at all
times during the course of the trial . . . the court, counsel for the
parties, and the jurors, shall refer to jurors by number and not by
name.”83 The Court made this proposal “to avoid any implication that
this anonymous procedure is being undertaken in any specific case
because of the dangerousness of that specific defendant.”84 This pro-
posal was attacked from various quarters, including the Virginia Press
Association and the Virginia Coalition for Open Government.85 The
ACLU of Virginia also objected.86 In a press release, it stated,
“[o]penness is essential to a fair judicial system, which is why U.S.
courts have universally rejected anything that resembles Star Chamber
justice. . . . Simply put, trials must be open to the public and that
includes knowing the identities of jurors who are deciding guilt or
innocence.”87 The Advisory Committee withdrew the blanket anonym-
ity idea and replaced it with a revised proposed rule.88 The revision
mirrored the General Assembly’s law. It requires a judge to find “good
cause” for secrecy before withholding juror identities.89 The new pro-
79. Kristi Jourdan, Maryland, Virginia Mull Proposals for Juries to be Anonymous in All
Trials, WASH. TIMES, July 26, 2009, at M4.
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-263.3 (2004).
81. Id.
82. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF COURT, VIRGINIA CODE § 19.2-263.3 AND CONFIDENTI-
ALITY OF JUROR INFORMATION (April 2009), available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/
courts/scv/amendments/juror_anonymity_rule.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See VA. PRESS ASS’N, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE 3A:14.1 (Aug. 20, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.vpa.net/images/pdf/VPA-Position-JurorAnonym.pdf; VA. COAL. FOR
OPEN GOV’T, COMMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED COURT RULE 3A:14.1 (2009), available
at http://www.opengovva.org/images/stories/misc/anonymousjurorcomments.pdf.
86. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF VA., ACLU OPPOSES PROPOSED RULE THAT WOULD
MAKE JURORS ANONYMOUS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (Sept. 1, 2009), available at http://acluva.
org/427/aclu-opposes-proposed-rule-that-would-make-jurors-anonymous-in-criminal-trials.
87. Id. (quoting ACLU of Virginia Executive Director Kent Willis).
88. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF COURT, VIRGINIA CODE § 19.2-263.3 AND CONFIDENTI-
ALITY OF JUROR INFORMATION, REVISED DRAFT RULE PUBLISHED FOR COMMENT (Oct. 2009),
available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/news/draft_revisions_rules/2009_10_revised_ju-
ror%20anonymity_rule.pdf.
89. Id.
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posal explains that the Advisory Committee “gave detailed considera-
tion to the many comments and suggestions received on the initial
draft rule, and focused on complying with the plain language of the
statute.”90
Virginia’s grappling with anonymity is just one example. Some
California courts have empaneled anonymous juries in every case.91
This policy stems from a state commission recommending blanket an-
onymity. The commission’s reasoning was twofold: instill security and
encourage jury service.92 California passed a law requiring that jurors’
identities be sealed following a criminal verdict.93 However, any per-
son can petition for this information if there is no “compelling inter-
est” against disclosure.94 If such a petition is filed, individual jurors
may object to the release of their names.95 The reasons for the law
include protecting “jurors’ privacy, safety and well-being.”96
A county in Ohio made all grand jury and petit jury lists anony-
mous.97 Under the rule, jurors’ names, addresses, and phone num-
bers remained anonymous to all, including the court.98 The Ohio
Supreme Court approved of this procedure in State v. Hill.99 In Hill,
the defendant was convicted of murder by an anonymous jury. The
court of appeals reversed because of the anonymous jury.100 The Ohio
Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the conviction. While acknowl-
edging the right to a public trial was “very important,” limiting it was
90. Id.
91. See Catherine Gewertz, Courthouse Makes Blanket Use of Juror Anonymity, L.A. TIMES,
July 25, 1994, at A1 (discussing court that withholds jurors’ names regardless of the nature
of the case); see also Erickson v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 230 (Ct. App. 1997)
(prohibiting a Placer County superior court from implementing its procedure of sealing
juror-identifying information in all civil actions and criminal proceedings prior to the re-
turn of the jury verdict).
92. J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1463 (1996).
93. S.B. 508, 1995–1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995).
94. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § § 237(a)(1), (b) (West 1996, as amended).
95. Id. §§ 237(c)–(d). According to the statute, “[t]he court shall sustain the protest
of the former juror if, in the discretion of the court the petitioner fails to show good cause,
the record establishes a compelling interest against disclosure. . . or the juror is unwilling
to be contacted by the petitioner.” Id. § 237(d).
96. S.B. 508, 1995–1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995).
97. See State v. Hill, 749 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ohio 2001) (quoting Loc.R. 1.14 of the
Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County, Ohio) (repealed Sept. 1, 2007).
98. Id.
99. 749 N.E.2d 274 (Ohio 2001).
100. Id. at 278.
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not reversible error.101 The court concluded, “there is no unqualified
constitutional right to know the identity of jurors.”102
Another state supreme court decision approving anonymity is
State v. Ivy.103 The trial court used an anonymous jury because it
found placing jurors “in danger would simply not be very responsi-
ble . . . .”104 It did not instruct the jury on anonymity.105 The Tennes-
see Supreme Court affirmed; its rationale threefold. First, state law
permitted anonymous juries.106 Second, matters concerning jury se-
lection were within the trial court’s ambit.107 Third, anonymity ena-
bled trial courts “to preserve the safety and sanctity of the jury.”108 The
absence of an instruction was not problematic. “[A] specific instruc-
tion as to anonymity simply calls the jury’s attention to what it may
have believed to be the accepted procedure.”109 Decisions like Ivy and
Hill embody how state courts treat anonymous juries. But exceptions
exist.
3. Rejecting Anonymity
State appellate courts have reversed because of anonymity. Courts
in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York have held an anonymous
jury hinders a defendant’s rights.110 Other courts have found jury in-
structions on anonymity deficient enough to merit a new trial. Those
cases are now examined.
a. Massachusetts
In Commonwealth v. Angiulo,111 the defendant was charged with an
array of crimes including racketeering and conspiracy to commit mur-
der.112 The prosecution moved for an anonymous jury to ensure ju-
rors were “free from intimidation.”113 Granting the motion, the court
did not inform jurors of their anonymity to avoid adverse inference
101. Id. at 281.
102. Id. at 282.
103. 188 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2006).
104. Id. at 143.
105. Id. at 145.
106. Id. at 144.
107. Id. at 144–45.
108. Id. at 144.
109. Id. at 145.
110. See infra notes 117–43.
111. 615 N.E.2d 155 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
112. Id. at 158.
113. Id. at 167.
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against the defendant.114 The defendant was convicted and sentenced
to life imprisonment.115 On appeal, the defendant argued a Massa-
chusetts law precluded anonymity.116 That provision mandated “[a]
prisoner indicted for a crime punishable with death or imprisonment
for life . . . shall have a list of the jurors who have been returned.”117
The appellate court reversed because the defendant had the right to
obtain the names and addresses of his jurors.118 But statutory author-
ity was not the only concern. The court noted anonymity “is likely to
taint the jurors’ opinion of the defendant, thereby burdening the pre-
sumption of innocence.”119 Finally, the court was troubled that no
curative instructions were given to the jury about its anonymity.120
In Commonwealth v. DuPont,121 the defendant was charged with as-
sault and armed robbery. The court moved sua sponte to redact the
jurors’ information.122 The court referenced prospective jurors by us-
ing only their first names. The appellate court was troubled by this
process because it was “likely that the jury included individuals who
had served as jurors in the past” and thus had not experienced this
approach.123 The catalyst for a new trial would ultimately be statutory
authority. Like in Angiulo, the court in DuPont invoked the same stat-
ute that mandates a defendant be provided with prospective jurors’
names and addresses.124 The trial court’s failure to adhere to this stat-
ute warranted a new trial.125 But instead of stopping there, the court
considered the “grave constitutional questions” of anonymity.126 It de-
termined the defendant’s presumption of innocence was not pre-
served because no explanation was given regarding anonymity.127 The
court also could not conclude the jury was fair and impartial. “A ju-
ror’s name and address are information potentially valuable to a party
in deciding whether to challenge a juror either for cause or by the use
114. Id.
115. Id. at 159.
116. Id. at 168–69.
117. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 277, § 66 (2008).
118. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d at 169–70.
119. Id. at 171.
120. Id. at 171–72.
121. No. 85-981-987, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 476, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 28,
1998).
122. Id. at *4.
123. Id. at *7.
124. Id. at *10.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at *13.
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of a preemptory challenge.”128 The final facet of the court’s constitu-
tional analysis concerned the “tradition of identified jurors.”129 The
court noted the colonial jury system “did not lend itself towards pro-
tecting the identity of the participants.”130 During those times, “every-
body knew everybody on the jury.”131 Acknowledging modern urban
societies were the antithesis of that milieu, anonymous juries still “un-
dermine[d] the shared values and practices which constituted the
common understanding of the drafters of the Sixth Amend-
ment . . . .”132 DuPont offers the most stinging critique of anonymous
juries.
b. New Jersey
In State v. Accetturo,133 the defendants were charged with conspir-
acy, racketeering, extortion, and murder. The defendants’ ties to or-
ganized crime prompted the state to move for an anonymous jury.
The State argued the defendants were “dangerous individuals who will
go to great lengths to obtain their ends.”134 The court was unmoved
for four reasons. First, no authority in New Jersey provided for ano-
nymity.135 Second, the risk of prejudice to the defendants was strong.
Third, the court could not conceive of truthful instructions as jurors
would not be so “naiive as to believe that news media coverage would
be the reason for their anonymity.”136 Fourth, the court concluded “it
would not be the anonymity itself, but rather the novelty of the proce-
dure which would give rise to the prejudice.”137
c. New York
In New York, anonymity is precluded by state criminal law. That
was the conclusion of People v. Gotti,138 where the court found “the
procedure is prohibited by the Criminal Procedure Law.”139 The stat-
ute states, “the court shall direct that the names of not less than twelve
128. Id.
129. Id. at *16.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at *17.
133. 619 A.2d 272 (N.J. Super. 1992).
134. Id. at 273.
135. Id. at 272.
136. Id. at 273.
137. Id. at 274.
138. Order of Court, People v. Gotti, Indictment No. 359/98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15,
1989), reprinted in United States v. Perry, 754 F. Supp. 202, ex. A at 204 (D. D.C. 1990).
139. Id. at 204.
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members of the panel be drawn and called as prescribed by the judici-
ary law.”140 A plain reading of this statute reveals jurors are to be iden-
tified by name. This law was again invoked in People v. Watts.141 Like in
Gotti, the court in Watts rejected anonymity because “New York pro-
vides a statutory right to [jurors’ names and addresses].”142 The mere
possibility of jury tampering was insufficient to justify an anonymous
jury.143
d. Grappling With Instructions
State courts have also demonstrated a more stringent approach to
jury instructions for anonymity. Deficient instructions spawned rever-
sal in several cases. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed a murder
conviction because of instructions in State v. Brown.144 After a witness
had been threatened, the court decided to refer to jurors only by
number. The trial court told jurors they would be identified by num-
bers because “as a further precaution, insofar as your safety and secur-
ity is concerned.”145 The Kansas Supreme Court did not take issue
with anonymity itself, it was the trial court’s failure to minimize the
prejudice of anonymity.146 The Kansas Supreme Court reversed be-
cause “the trial court’s comments may have bolstered the state’s argu-
ments and given the impression that the witnesses had reason to fear
retaliation.”147
Similar to Brown is the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in State
v. Tucker.148 Jurors in a murder trial were identified by numbers. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the trial
court did not avoid prejudicing the defendant.149 Instead, the trial
court only gave general instructions on the presumption of innocence
and the State’s burden of proving guilt.150 Since this did not neutral-
ize the effect of anonymity, the court reversed.
Courts are cautious on the issue of instructions. This is under-
standable, as anonymity impinges the presumption of innocence. Ex-
140. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.15(1)(a) (McKinney 2002).
141. People v. Watts, 661 N.Y.S.2d 768 (N.Y. Supp. 1997).
142. Id. at 772.
143. Id.
144. 118 P.3d 1273 (Kan. 2005).
145. Id. at 1276 (quoting trial court’s statements to jury).
146. Id. at 1281–82.
147. Id. at 1284.
148. State v. Tucker, 657 N.W.2d 374 (Wis. 2003).
149. Id. at 381.
150. Id.
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plaining to jurors that anonymity is routine is untruthful.151 Worse, its
falsity is transparent. Jurors do not live in a vacuum. They may have
been impaneled before, had family members on juries, or have famili-
arity with the trial process. They may surmise that anonymity is not the
norm, and an instruction to the contrary might foster distrust. Using
the media as the scapegoat may be more believable, but it is still prob-
lematic for the same reasons. Indeed, one trial court rejected the pub-
licity explanation as improper because it was “a subterfuge which
concealed the actual reason for anonymity.”152
In sum, the state realm is more conducive to challenging ano-
nymity than the federal. State courts are more sensitive to the flaws of
anonymity. But before those impediments are examined, the reasons
for anonymity are considered.
II. The Benefits of Anonymous Juries
Courts articulate different reasons for impaneling anonymous ju-
ries. They include insulating jurors from tampering, increasing can-
dor during voir dire, and protecting jurors from media intrusion. The
merit of each basis is assessed.
A. Fostering Jury Safety
Juror safety is an oft cited basis for anonymity. For example, the
Eighth Circuit cited it in approving anonymity in United States v. Peo-
ples.153 It held that trial courts possess wide latitude in impaneling an
anonymous jury “if it finds that a person’s life or safety is in jeop-
ardy.”154 In the seminal case of United States v. Barnes,155 the Second
Circuit approved of anonymity because of the dangers to jurors. Juror
safety has been invoked for trials of alleged terrorists. An anonymous
jury tried the six men charged with plotting to blow up the Sears
Tower.156 The jury was also anonymous in the trial of six men charged
with attempting to blow up Fort Dix.157 Attorney Lynne Stewart was
151. Kristan Metzler, Edmond Appeals Verdict, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at C6 (noting
that when the judge told jurors that anonymous juries were not unusual, he “told them a
little white lie”).
152. United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1025 (3d Cir. 1988).
153. 250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2001).
154. Id. at 635.
155. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979).
156. Curt Anderson, Defense Questions Fairness for Six in Terror Plot Retrial, CHARLESTOWN
GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 2008, at 7A.
157. Jeffrey Gold, Jury in Fort Dix Plot Trial Will Be Anonymous, THE INTELLIGENCER, Sept.
7, 2007, at B6.
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found guilty by an anonymous jury of supporting terrorists during her
defense of an Egyptian sheik.158 One exception to this trend was the
trial of a man charged with funneling money to Hamas.159 The district
court found no likelihood of intimidation, as “the mere invocation of
the word ‘terrorism,’ without more, is insufficient to warrant such an
anonymous jury.”160
Anonymity does further security. With jurors identified by num-
bers, the ability to contact them is diminished, making them less sus-
ceptible to intimidation and tampering. While threats to jurors are
rare, they can happen. Jurors who acquitted the police officers in the
Rodney King case endured threatening phone calls.161 Jurors in the
trial of Dan White, charged with the murder of San Francisco Mayor
George Moscone and City Supervisor Harvey Milk, were threatened
with death.162 Thus, juror safety is not an abstraction. The Third Cir-
cuit empathized with the jurors fear of retaliation in United States v.
Scarfo.163 The court described them as “not hypothetical” and that it
was aware “that even in routine criminal cases, [jurors] are often un-
comfortable with disclosure of their names and addresses.”164 But
while these fears are real, experience demonstrates they have not
been realized. Moreover, criminal laws already prohibit such
contact.165
When jurors or witnesses are threatened, anonymity is warranted.
But safety should not be a cudgel used to marginalize objections to
anonymity. Evidence of intimidation should be anonymity’s raison
d’eˆtre. Anything less is not enough.
B. Engendering Juror Privacy
Jury service can be unpleasant. Lengthy questionnaires, back-
ground investigations, media exposure, and personal intrusion are oc-
cupational hazards. Inquiries regarding medication, religious
158. Julia Preston, Lawyer Is Guilty of Aiding Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A1.
159. Rudolph Bush, Hamas-case Jury To Be Named, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10, 2006, at 3.
160. Id.
161. Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in
Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 128 (1996).
162. Id.
163. United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 1988).
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-441 (2004) (prohibiting bribery of jurors); id.
§ 18.2-456(2) (allowing summary punishment for contempt, including threat to juror); id.
§ 18.2-460 (describing penalty for obstructing justice).
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practices, and personal improprieties can be fair game.166 One court
observed that voir dire “compels jurors to recall their darkest mo-
ments, which they may have struggled for years to forget, and then be
required to recount them in public.”167 Worse, venire persons are
powerless against this privacy invasion.168
Anonymity is an antidote to this intrusion. It may make an already
stressful situation, less so.169 Courts are sensitive to this reality. Jury
instructions often cite privacy as the basis for anonymity. The D.C.
Circuit affirmed an instruction that anonymity was “a common prac-
tice followed in the majority of cases in federal court” done to protect
juror’s privacy.170 Legislatures are also cognizant of juror privacy. For
example, a Georgia statute provides that “in the questionnaire and
during voir dire examination, judges should ensure that the privacy of
prospective jurors is reasonably protected.”171
Anonymous juries are a sine qua non of high profile trials. Courts
have correctly concluded that thrusting jurors into the spotlight sim-
ply for doing their civic duty is a legitimate basis for anonymity. Ano-
nymity was used in the trials of O.J. Simpson, Oliver North, the
Branch Davidians, and John Gotti.172 While anonymity has its place in
controversial cases, such instances are rare. Nor can such use justify
using privacy as the basis for anonymity in non-headline grabbing
cases.
Anonymity protects jurors’ privacy in an additional way. When
parties have access to the names of venire persons before trial they
can investigate their backgrounds. Private litigants use investigative
166. David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror’s Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and
Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 18–20 (1997).
167. Bellas v. Super. Ct. of Alameda County, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 391 (Ct. App.
2000).
168. See Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 360–61 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (overturning
contempt conviction of venire person who refused to answer certain questions on juror
questionnaire because state trial court ignored juror privacy).
169. See James E. Kelley, Addressing Juror Stress: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 43 DRAKE L.
REV. 97, 107–16 (1994) (reporting an Iowa study of over 500 jurors that demonstrated
“severe stress symptoms” from jury service, collecting sources documenting juror stress,
and noting that some jurors exhibit post traumatic stress); Daniel W. Shuman et al., The
Health Effects of Jury Service, 18 LAW & PYSCH. REV. 267, 268 (1994) (surveying relevant re-
search and stating that studies suggest “jurors may experience stress from being removed
from their families and jobs, from being shown especially graphic evidence, or from the
trial process itself”).
170. United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
171. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-11(b) (2008).
172. See Adam Liptak, Nameless Juries Are on the Rise in Crime Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2002, at A1.
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services. Government attorneys use law enforcement agencies.173 In-
vestigators may view a prospective juror’s home, noting her neighbor-
hood, automobile, and other indications of her lifestyle.174 A drive-by
checklist is set forth in a selection manual published by two promi-
nent jury consultants.175 This surveillance, while disturbing, gleans in-
formation on public display. But when the identities of prospective
jurors are unknown, such tactics are stymied.
Maintaining juror privacy is a laudable endeavor. But in an age of
blogs, Facebook, and Twitter, privacy is at a nadir. The merits of this
development can be debated, but the reality cannot be avoided.
Courts are rightfully concerned about jurors’ privacy. But lamenting
the privacy erosion of individuals whose personal information and
daily activities are posted online seems futile. In short, this inveterate
attention seeking impacts the notion of juror privacy. “Courts now op-
erate within a larger culture of jurors addicted to their handheld de-
vices, chatting with friends and ‘Twittering’ about the details of their
daily lives.”176 That is not to say jurors lose their privacy rights if they
use social networking sites. Rather, juror privacy, as a basis for ano-
nymity, must be viewed in the context of truncated privacy notions.
And through this purview, the privacy basis for juror anonymity is
undermined.
C. Facilitating Voir Dire
A more reliable voir dire process is a benefit of anonymity.177 “Ju-
rors who are self-conscious and anxious are more likely to give dishon-
173. See United States v. Falange, 426 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1970) (utilizing FBI and
credit bureau records); United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 882–83 (2d Cir. 1958)
(using tax returns); Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 141 (1st Cir. 1950) (utilizing FBI
report); State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 135 (Iowa 1987) (using criminal records);
Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 367 N.E.2d 802, 809 (Mass. 1977) (using probation reports);
Losavio v. Mayber, 496 P.2d 1032, 1033 (Colo. 1972) (en banc) (utilizing criminal
records); Commonwealth v. Smith, 215 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Mass. 1966) (utilizing police of-
ficer investigation of prospective jurors).
174. Jeremy W. Barber, The Jury Is Still Out: The Role of Jury Science in the Modern American
Courtroom, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225, 1236 (1994) (noting that one common type of juror
investigation involves the “home surveillance of potential jurors”).
175. See LISA BLUE & ROBERT HIRSCHHORN, 1 BLUE’S GUIDE TO JURY SELECTION, § 9:1
(West & ATLA 2004) (noting items to look for include whether the yard is kept well, if
there are toys outside, and if there are bars on the windows).
176. See VA. PRESS ASS’N, supra note 85, at 13.
177. See generally Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous
Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123 (1996) (encouraging judges and legislators to
consider the use of anonymous juries in criminal cases, especially in urban areas where
anonymity is feasible).
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est answers at voir dire.”178 With the ability to conceal her name,
employer, or address, a venire person would be more apt to reveal
information she might not otherwise disclose. These revelations give
litigants a better understanding of jurors.179 “If the risks of personal
humiliation, damage to reputation, and personal embarrassment are
minimized by protecting prospective jurors’ privacy . . . the task of
compiling a competent and conscientious jury may be easier.”180 A
voir dire in which individuals are anonymous is more open, leading to
a less biased jury.
Individualized voir dire supports the use of anonymous juries. In
individualized voir dire, venire persons are queried only in front of
the parties and judge. Individualized voir dire allows venire persons to
respond to questions more candidly because it provides privacy.181
Studies demonstrate that individual examination of venire persons
better expose bias.182 This is logical—the need for conformity be-
comes greater as the need for group affiliation increases.183 But when
other venire persons are absent, these concerns abate and the propen-
sity for being forthright increases. Similarly, anonymity likely increases
jurors’ willingness to answer voir dire questions more honestly.184
Without having one’s identity known, there is less concern about ex-
pressing one’s honest beliefs. Internet chat rooms and message
boards exemplify this.185 The cloak of online anonymity enables In-
ternet users to shed their inhibitions.
178. Id. at 137.
179. Marcy Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 395–99 (1994) (dis-
cussing problems that may arise when a juror is tempted to capitalize on his service by
accepting book deals or giving interviews for television programs).
180. Michael R. Glover, Comment, The Right to Privacy of Prospective Jurors During Voir
Dire, 70 CAL. L. REV. 708, 712–13 (1982); see also United States v. Padilla-Valenzuela, 896 F.
Supp. 968, 972 (D. Ariz. 1995) (determining that proposed questionnaire was so invasive as
to violate right of privacy of prospective jurors).
181. MUNSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 69.
182. Michael T. Nietzel & Ronald C. Dillehay, The Effects of Variation in Voir Dire Proce-
dures in Capital Murder Trials, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1 (1982); David Suggs & Bruce D.
Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 258–61
(1981).
183. See McGhee & Teevan, Conformity Behavior and Need for Affiliation, 72 J. SOC. PSYCH.
117, 120 (1967) (noting likelihood that need for affiliation or conformity varies with the
type of affiliational relationship of the members of the group).
184. MUNSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 82.
185. See VA. COAL. FOR OPEN GOV’T, supra note 85, at 2 (“In today’s electronic-commu-
nication culture, hateful, vindictive and illogical rhetoric is often spewed anonymously.
Hiding behind pseudonyms and inscrutable screen names, individuals are free to make
wild accusations and draw erroneous conclusions without fear of being found out. Given a
perpetual cloak of anonymity, jurors, too, would be freed of the confines of procedure,
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Anonymity, to a certain degree, facilitates voir dire. As one court
observed, access to information provided in voir dire “if coupled with
the names, could cause the jurors pain and embarrassment.”186 Ano-
nymity ameliorates that problem.
D. Summation
Surveys find an overwhelming majority of people surveyed prefer
anonymity.187 In one poll, eighty-four percent of respondents believed
jurors should be anonymous in criminal cases.188 A judge who con-
ducted trials with anonymous juries reported that only six or seven of
the 2800 jurors wanted their identities revealed when faced with the
option of anonymity.189 Some judges also approve of anonymity. In
one survey, seventy-six percent of federal judges in Texas favored
anonymous juries, while only twenty percent opposed.190 Forty-four
percent of Texas state judges approved while forty-five percent op-
posed.191 Two groups not surveyed were criminal defense attorneys
and their clients.
Benefits to anonymity exist. Protecting jurors from intimidation,
tampering, and media intrusion is imperative. Thus, little debate ex-
ists over the ends sought by anonymous juries. The issue is the means
with which these means are accomplished. When contemplating ano-
nymity, courts balance “the defendant’s interest in conducting mean-
ingful voir dire and in maintaining the presumption of innocence,
against [the jury’s] interest in remaining free from real or threatened
evidence or common sense, allowing them to render verdicts based on biases without any
accountability.”).
186. State v. Pennell, 583 A.2d 1348, 1355 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990).
187. See, e.g., Kelso, supra note 92, at 1463 (reporting that in an anonymous jury pro-
gram at a Los Cerritos Municipal Court, only 6 out of over 2800 jurors did not wish to be
anonymous); Caroline K. Simon, The Juror in New York City: Attitudes and Experiences, 61
A.B.A. J. 207, 210 (1975) (study of 5079 juror responses to a 1972 survey found over fifteen
objected to their names and addresses being made known to criminal defendant).
188. A 1995 Glamour magazine survey asked, “Should jurors in criminal cases be al-
lowed to serve anonymously?” Eighty-four percent answered “yes, in all cases.” Another
eleven percent responded, “yes, but only in cases involving gangs, cults, or possible social
unrest.” Five percent answered “no.” Should We Protect the Identity of Jurors in Criminal Trials?,
GLAMOUR, Mar. 1995, at 159.
189. Catherine Gewertz, Judge Halts Use of Jury Anonymity in Bellflower, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
10, 1995, at B3.
190. John Attanasio, Foreword: Juries Rule, 54 SMU L. REV. 1681, 1686 n.29 (2001).
191. Id.
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violence.”192 These adverse consequences of anonymity comprise the
next Part.
III. The Costs of Juror Anonymity
Anonymity has three repercussions. First, it casts the defendant as
a dangerous person. Second, it undermines the presumption of inno-
cence. Third, it hampers jury selection. The Sixth Amendment and
Due Process Clause guarantee a defendant the right to an impartial
jury.193 Analyzing the Sixth Amendment, Justice Harlan remarked,
“jurors will perform their respective functions more responsibly in an
open court than in secret proceedings.”194 This concern underlies the
following objections.
A. Innocence Lost
The presumption of innocence is integral to the American justice
system. While not articulated in the Constitution, courts have long
recognized the right is sacrosanct.195 The Supreme Court observed
the presumption of innocence “is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the adminis-
tration of our criminal law.”196 The prosecution may not create trial
conditions that affect the jurors’ perception of the defendant unless a
substantial governmental interest exists.197 In Estelle v. Williams,198 the
Court noted that the state cannot compel an accused to stand trial
while dressed in prison garb because it impacted the presumption of
innocence.199 The Court reasoned this presumption was “a basic com-
ponent of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.”200 The
concerns of Estelle are implicated by anonymity. Jurors can interpret
anonymity as a precaution against an unpredictable and violent defen-
dant. These attributes are equated with guilt, prejudicing the jury
before the first witness is called. Courts have noted this predicament.
Anonymity “implicates the defendant’s constitutional right to a pre-
192. United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1264 (2d Cir. 1994)).
193. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n.6 (1976).
194. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
195. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453–54 (1895) (noting the axio-
matic nature of this principle).
196. Id.
197. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976).
198. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 503.
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sumption of innocence by ‘rais[ing] the specter that the defendant is
a dangerous person from whom the jurors must be protected . . . .’”201
Errors emanating from the use of anonymous juries are reviewed
under a harmless error standard. But the effects on the presumption
of innocence demand more. Structural errors transcend harmless er-
ror analysis. A structural error is a “defect affecting the framework
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the
trial process itself.”202 For example, the right to an impartial judge is a
right so fundamental that its violation can never be harmless.203 Addi-
tional errors not subject to the harmless error rule: unlawful exclusion
of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury,204 the right to
self-representation at trial,205 and the right to public trial.206 Anony-
mous juries raise similar concerns. Anonymity is not simply an error in
the trial process—it denies the right to an impartial jury. Thus, it
touches upon the same vital nerves that the Supreme Court has
deemed to affect the entire trial framework.
When circumstantial evidence and eyewitness testimony suggest
guilt, a defendant often clings to the presumption of innocence. But
this defense is rendered nugatory if jurors view anonymity as protec-
tion from the defendant. “The most damaging aspect of [United States
v. Barnes] . . . is the devastating blow dealt to the presumption of inno-
cence.”207 While this repercussion is the most serious, it is not the only
one.
B. Inhibiting Voir Dire
Voir dire facilitates the Sixth and Seventh Amendments. The
Sixth Amendment provides that criminal defendants “enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”208 The Supreme
Court has explained that “[v]oire dire plays a critical function in as-
suring the criminal defendant that his [constitutional] right to an im-
partial jury will be honored.”209 The importance of voir dire was
201. United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1034 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994)).
202. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
203. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967) (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510 (1927)).
204. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
205. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
206. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
207. Abramovsky, supra note 26, at 35.
208. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
209. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. United
States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981)).
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recognized by the Supreme Court in Turner v Murray.210 If voir dire is
inadequate, a defendant’s sentence cannot stand.211
Voir dire is ground zero for the adversarial process. The prolifera-
tion of jury selection consultants embodies this phenomenon. Voir
dire can take longer than the trial itself. A study of 462 cases revealed
that voir dire was longer than the trial twenty percent of the time.212
Another survey found that jury selection constituted between twenty
to thirty-seven percent of the average criminal trial.213 The emphasis
on voir dire clashes with the increasing use of anonymous juries. Ano-
nymity can foster voir dire, as articulated above, but it also hinders it.
Information about the identity and occupation of a prospective juror
can spur additional questions leading to the exercise of peremptory
and for cause challenges. Hiding information about prospective jurors
can stifle lines of questioning. To make an informed selection, a de-
fendant needs as much information as possible.214 This premise is il-
lustrated by Commonwealth v. DuPont,215 where the appellate court
reversed a conviction because the defendant could not determine if a
juror lives “in a neighborhood whose residents have demographic
characteristics predictive of their likely response to the issues in the
case.”216
Voir dire protects a defendant’s right to an impartial jury “by ex-
posing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of po-
tential jurors.”217 When an individual has a close connection to the
facts, bias is presumed.218 The failure to respond honestly during voir
dire also indicates bias.219 But when fundamental information about a
person is untouchable, these biases are harder to unearth. Anonymity
thus violates the Sixth Amendment by inhibiting a defendant’s ability
210. 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986).
211. Id.
212. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Chal-
lenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 157 n.13 (1989) (citing a study
conducted by the New York Governor’s Commission on Administration of Justice in the
1980s).
213. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ON TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
TRIALS 40 (1988).
214. See Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171–72 (1950) (“Preservation of the
opportunity to prove actual bias is a guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial
jury.”).
215. No. 85-981-987, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 476 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 1998).
216. Id. at *47 (citing United States v. DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294, 301 (7th Cir. 1996)).
217. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984).
218. Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 1467 (10th Cir. 1994).
219. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 441–43 (2000) (noting juror’s failure to di-
vulge material information was misleading and could show juror was not impartial).
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to challenge jurors. On this, the Seventh Circuit put it best: “so long as
we have challenges for cause and peremptory challenges the objection
to anonymous jurors that it deprives the lawyers of information essen-
tial to their exercise of a valued procedural right cannot be rated as
negligible.”220
Hampering voir dire does not only hurt the defendant. Jurors can
engage in improprieties when not subject to public scrutiny.221 The
prosecution in Barnes was precluded from inquiring into the back-
ground of a defendant’s acquaintance.222 Thus, anonymity may have
enabled Barnes’ co-defendant, Guy Fisher, to escape a guilty verdict.
Barnes is not the only case in which an anonymous juror’s identity was
compromised. A similar occurrence transpired in John Gotti’s murder
trial. Anonymity enabled a juror with mob ties to be impaneled.223
The juror contacted Gotti, and they devised an arrangement whereby
the juror would vote not guilty in exchange for payment.224 Thus, the
trials of John Gotti and Leroy Barnes demonstrate that anonymous
juries enable the defendant to meddle with jury selection. If the jury
had not been anonymous, prosecutors or the press could have investi-
gated the jurors’ backgrounds.
C. The Right of Access to Trial Proceedings
Since the sixteenth century voir dire has been conducted in pub-
lic.225 The transparency of the process was borrowed from the English
system.226 This openness “enhances both the basic fairness of the
criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public
confidence in the system.”227 But anonymity undermines the public’s
right of access.228 Journalists often consider jurors part of the story.229
The perspective of jurors adds important insight to a case. Preventing
220. United States v. DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294, 301 (7th Cir. 1996).
221. Kenneth B. Nunn, When Juries Meet the Press: Rethinking the Jury’s Representative Func-
tion in Highly Publicized Cases, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 405, 433–34 (1995) (stating high-
profile trials may attract jurors more interested in fame than in returning jury verdicts).
222. See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
223. See Juror Guilty of Taking Bribe in 1987 Gotti Trial, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 1992 at 11; see
also JERRY CAPECI & GENE MUSTAIN, GOTTI: RISE AND FALL 173–75 (1996).
224. CAPECI & MUSTAIN, supra note 223, at 173–75.
225. Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 507 (1984) [hereinafter Press
Enterprise I].
226. Id. at 508.
227. Id.
228. See Brief for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellee at 5, Hill v. Ohio, 749 N.E.2d 274 (Ohio 2001) (No. 00-591), available
at www.rcfp.org/news/documents/hill.html (noting the “important presumption of access
to jury selection proceedings has been repeatedly recognized worldwide”).
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access to the jury omits an important chapter.230 “If the press and the
larger community lose the ability to identify jurors, juror misconduct
is far less likely to be unearthed and reported.”231
The constitutional right of access to criminal trials stems from the
First Amendment.232 The Supreme Court examined the right of ac-
cess to trial proceedings in Press Enterprise I,233 decided in 1984, and
Press Enterprise II,234 decided two years later. In Press Enterprise I, a Cali-
fornia trial court closed voir dire to the press because of jurors’ pri-
vacy interests. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Jury selection was a
“public process” and limitations on it contravened the First Amend-
ment. However, the Court noted that a prospective juror’s privacy was
a legitimate interest.235 Voir dire can “give rise to a compelling inter-
est of a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply per-
sonal matters that person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of
the public domain.”236 Thus, the media has the right to attend the
jury selection portion of a criminal trial, unless the trial court finds
“that closure is essential to preserve higher values.”237
Press Enterprise II concerned the release of a preliminary hearing
transcript.238 The Court delineated two factors to determine whether
a First Amendment right of access to a proceeding exists. “[F]irst,
there is a substantial probability that the defendant’s right to a fair
trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and,
second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect
the defendant’s fair trial rights.”239 Noting public access to criminal
trials and the selection of jurors was essential to the proper function-
ing of the criminal justice system, the Court held “preliminary hear-
ings are sufficiently like a trial to justify the same conclusion.”240
229. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 738 (Del. 1990) (describing the use of
jurors’ actions and reactions by one news reporter).
230. See Brief for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellee, supra note 228, at 4 (“Public scrutiny also promotes fairness by oper-
ating as a restraint on possible abuses of judicial power . . . .”).
231. VA. PRESS ASS’N, supra note 85, at 11.
232. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603–04 (1982).
233. Press Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
234. Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) [hereinafter Press Enter-
prise II].
235. Press Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 511.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 510.
238. Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 1.
239. Id. at 14.
240. Id. at 12.
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The Press Enterprise cases capture the difficulty of balancing ano-
nymity with the interest of public access. Limits to juror information
are usually upheld. An instructive example is United States v. Brown.241
The district court denied media outlets’ requests for juror informa-
tion in the conspiracy trial of former Louisiana Governor Edwin Ed-
wards.242 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit recognized jurors’ right to
privacy was a strong governmental interest.243 It upheld the decision
because redacting juror names “may constitute a reasonable alterna-
tive to safeguard jurors from unwarranted embarrassment.”244 The
court further observed that jurors “need not become unwilling pawns
in the frenzied media battle.”245
While anonymity is an unwarranted limitation on the press, pro-
ponents of media access view the issue in an unrealistically sanguine
light. There is a dark side to unfettered access. The press has detailed
jurors’ occupations, marital status, children’s ages, and religious be-
liefs. Jurors whose identities were revealed have been subjected to
threats and harassment. The jurors’ identities were hidden in United
States v. DeLorean.246 Yet reporters used the license plate numbers of
jurors’ cars to uncover their identities.247 A similar occurrence played
out in the Scott Peterson trial.248 Post-verdict interviews can invade
juror privacy more than voir dire because the media’s questioning is
not limited by court rules.249 Yet despite occasional abuse, media pres-
sure is a sine qua non of an honest judicial system. The Supreme Court
said as much in Sheppard v. Maxwell.250 “The press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism.”251
241. 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2001).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 918 (citing United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983)).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 921.
246. See Robert M. Takasugi, Jury Selection in a High Profile Case: U.S. v. DeLorean, 40
AM. U. L. REV. 837, 840 (1991) (describing the method by which members of the media
obtained jurors’ telephone numbers for interview purposes).
247. Id.
248. See Jourdan, supra note 79.
249. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Postverdict Inter-
views, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 307 (1993).
250. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
251. Id. at 350.
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D. Summation
The fear that jurors could be harmed because of their verdict is
understandable but unfounded.252 No one has ever been killed be-
cause he sat on a jury.253 Security is imperative. But the same basis
could be invoked for witnesses testifying against criminal defend-
ants.254 While the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause prevents
witnesses from testifying anonymously, a court could declare safety ne-
cessitates a witness testify anonymously. The rationale of security has
limits.
IV. The Impact of Juror Anonymity
Courts have accepted anonymity without knowing its impact.
While courts recognize anonymity’s inherent problems, their analyses
are mired in generalities. If courts delved deeper into the implications
of anonymity, they might be less inclined to use it. Anonymity raises
two crucial questions. First, do anonymous juries impede the right to a
fair trial? Second, does the cloak of anonymity affect a juror? As courts
have shed little light on these inquiries, it is imperative that social sci-
ence research be considered. The law has benefited greatly from so-
cial science on subjects like voir dire, the death penalty, and jury
psychology. Social science encompasses psychology, sociology, eco-
nomics, and small-group decision making. This Part demonstrates
that social science vindicates the concerns about anonymity. The sin-
gle study considering anonymous jurors is considered first. Studies in-
volving juror honesty and juror accountability are then examined.
Finally, the effects of security measures such as sequestration and law
enforcement officers are extrapolated to anonymity. While each dis-
cussion is distinct, they each reach the same conclusion—anonymity
hurts defendants.
252. See VA. PRESS ASS’N, supra note 85, at 3–4 (“A Nexis search of press reports pub-
lished since 1990 reveals few Virginia criminal trials involving alleged juror intimidation by
parties or related outsiders.”)
253. See Robert M. Anselmo, The Decision in United States v. Brown: The Fifth Circuit
Interprets “Justice is Blind” Literally, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 469, 471 (2002).
254. This argument could also apply to judges. Safety may become such a concern that
judges could preside anonymously over trials. In countries such as Peru, masked judges
presiding anonymously in specially constituted courts try many cases. Abramovsky & Edel-
stein, supra note 51, at 482. “Such abdication of judicial accountability is arguably different
only in degree from the empanelment of anonymous juries.” Id.
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A. Social Science and Anonymous Juries
Anonymous juries have escaped the focus of social science re-
searchers for several reasons. First, anonymous juries are not routine.
Second, they are recent. Third, anonymous jurors never have their
identity revealed, making them difficult to contact. Hence, the paucity
of research. As one commentator notes, “in a recent review of the past
forty-five years of empirical research on jury deliberations . . . not one
study, of more than 200 reviewed, examined the impact or signifi-
cance of confidentiality on jury decision making.”255 While this com-
mentator acknowledges the sole exception discussed below, she
concludes that “confidentiality can lead to ‘frank but less full’
deliberations.”256
The importance of anonymity’s psychological impact cannot be
understated. Anonymous jury supporters note that critics’ conclusions
of how jurors interpret anonymity “depend[ ] on certain unsupported
assumptions about juror perception and knowledge.”257 Similarly, the
California Commission approving the use of anonymous juries noted:
“[t]he criticism that jurors may change their decision making
processes because of identification by number is speculative.”258 As
long as concerns about anonymity remain “speculative” and “unsup-
ported,” anonymous juries will proliferate without regard to defend-
ants’ rights.
B. How Anonymity Impacts Jurors
The effects of anonymity vary. For example, one study found that
subjects were more aggressive if they were anonymous to their vic-
tim.259 Another found that anonymity had no significant effect on sub-
jects’ aggressiveness.260 Psychologists contend that anonymity reduces
feelings of accountability by decreasing public self-awareness.261
255. Gia Lee, The President’s Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197 (2008); see also Dennis J.
Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 622–24 (2001) (reviewing variables of numerous jury deci-
sion-making studies, none of which discuss confidentiality).
256. Lee, supra note 255, at 234.
257. Wertheim, supra note 50, at 988.
258. Kelso, supra note 92, at 1463–64.
259. Edward Donnerstein et al., Variables in Interracial Aggression: Anonymity, Expected Re-
taliation, and a Riot, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 236, 236 (1972).
260. Edward Diener, Effects of Prior Destructive Behavior, Anonymity, and Group Presence on
Deindividuation and Aggression, 33 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 497, 497 (1976).
261. D. Lynn Hazelwood & John C. Brigham, The Effects of Juror Anonymity on Jury Ver-
dicts, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 699 (1998).
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“Thus, individuals are aware of what they are doing but are less con-
cerned about others evaluations . . . .”262
Only one study examines the impact of juror anonymity on deci-
sion making—The Effects of Juror Anonymity on Jury Verdicts.263 “Twenty
four-person anonymous juries and [twenty] four-person non-anony-
mous juries rendered individual and group verdicts for three student
defendants charged with selling drugs . . . . When unanimous guilty
verdicts were reached, juries imposed one of five punishments, vary-
ing in severity.”264 Non-anonymous participants provided their name
and contact information.265 Those in the anonymous groups were
given a paper explaining the “Special Procedures to Maintain Ano-
nymity of Student Jurors.”266
The authors predicted anonymous juries would be more prone to
convict. They were correct. Anonymous juries had a higher conviction
rate (thirty-seven percent) than did non-anonymous juries (twenty-two
percent).267 The effect of anonymity was greatest when evidence of
guilt was strong. Anonymous juries imposed the harshest punishment
(expulsion) more often than did non-anonymous juries.268 However,
anonymous juries did not feel less committed to their decisions or less
accountable than non-anonymous juries. The authors concluded,
“[t]he results of the present study provide some support for the hy-
pothesis that anonymous juries may be more likely to convict
defendants.”269
This study confirms the suspicions of those critical of anonymous
juries. This is only one study, and the sample size was relatively small.
But the proof is in the results. Anonymity certainly had an impact on
how jurors viewed the defendants. Anonymous jurors were more
prone to convict. They also had less compunction about imposing the
most severe punishment. The disparity between anonymous and non-
anonymous jurors cannot be dismissed as negligible. A fifteen percent
increase in convictions is significant. Not being identifiable makes ju-
rors less concerned about the rights of defendants. While the study
did not delve into the reasons, the lack of accountability is one likely
explanation. Being able to remain anonymous, these jurors may have
262. Id.
263. Id. at 695.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 701.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 703.
268. Id. at 695.
269. Id. at 712.
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felt less need to justify their verdict. After imposing a guilty verdict
and the most severe punishment, they can then disappear into the
crowd.
While the study needs to be replicated, it demonstrates anonym-
ity alters the decision making process of jurors. Given the study’s isola-
tion, the remaining Parts move beyond anonymity and apply the
findings of other social science studies to anonymity.
C. Juror Honesty and Juror Accountability
Researchers conducted the following studies for purposes other
than anonymity. The first examines honesty during voir dire, and the
second considers accountability for juror decisions. Nevertheless,
their findings shed light on anonymity.
1. Juror Honesty
The first study examined the effects of juror honesty while an-
swering questions during voir dire.270 The study’s focus was evaluation
anxiety—an individual’s concern about self image. The study revealed
that evaluation anxiety determined whether a response to a question
was truthful.271 The authors thus concluded that concern about self
image affected honesty.272
A venire person might be less concerned about self image if she
was anonymous. There is no proof that anonymity impacts self image.
But if a person’s name, address, and place of work are unknown she
might be less self conscious and thus more honest. This study lends
credence to the theory that anonymity engenders openness. If one’s
background is not known, concerns about self image diminish. Thus,
juror responses become more truthful as hesitancy to share personal
information abates.
2. Juror Accountability
Social scientists define accountability as “the implicit or explicit
expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings,
and actions to others.”273 Decision makers who must justify their con-
270. See Linda L. Marshall & Althea Smith, The Effects of Demand Characteristics, Evalua-
tion Anxiety, and Expectancy on Juror Honesty During Voir Dire, 120 J. PSYCHOL. 213 (1986).
271. Id. at 214.
272. Id.
273. Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255 (1999). Although deliberating jurors argue their positions with
each other in the jury room, it has been disputed whether this limited form of accountabil-
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clusion engage in “preemptive self-criticism” and often think in more
complex ways.274 Thus, jurors who must justify their decisions deliber-
ate more thoughtfully.275 These realities have important implications
for anonymous juries.
Scholar Phillip E. Tetlock conducted an accountability study con-
sisting of seventy-two college students presented with descriptions of
evidence from a murder trial.276 The study considered whether ac-
countability affects how one processes information during jury delib-
erations.277 The study defined accountability as “pressures to justify
one’s impressions to others.”278 The evidence was split equally be-
tween incriminating and exonerating.279 The researchers manipu-
lated the accountability variable by placing the subjects in two
groups.280 The “no accountability” subjects were told that their im-
pressions of the accused would be confidential and could not be
traced to them.281 Subjects in the “accountability” group were told,
before looking at the evidence, that they would be asked to justify
their decisions.282 The subjects were given the same information, but
in varied orders, to examine the effects of primacy and recency.283
The findings are telling. Subjects held accountable recalled more
case material than subjects who were unaccountable.284 The differ-
ences were significant between the two groups, regardless of the order
of evidence. The mean amount of evidence recalled by those in the
unaccountable group was measured at level ten while the accountable
group was at level twelve.285 Accountability also affected the verdict.
For those held accountable, the mean likelihood of guilt was forty-
seven percent.286 For those held not accountable, the mean likelihood
ity to each other is sufficient to ensure well-reasoned decisions that inspire public confi-
dence. See John D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 477, 482 (2002).
274. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 273, at 256–57.
275. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Per-
ceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 788, 801 (2000) (citing
study which holds that accountability can “improve the quality of information processing”).
276. Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and the Perseverance of First Impressions, 46 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 285, 287 (1983).
277. Id. at 285.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 286.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 288.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 289.
285. Id. fig.2.
286. Id. fig.1.
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of guilt was sixty-seven percent.287 Thus, the two groups perceived the
defendant’s guilt differently.288 Accountability also reduced the pri-
macy effects, which is noteworthy for criminal prosecutions.289 Sub-
jects who did not have to justify their impressions of the defendant’s
guilt were more likely to be influenced by the first presentation of the
prosecutor.290 Tetlock concluded that accountability made people at-
tuned to the reasoning behind their decision and “motivate[d] com-
plex and vigilant information processing.”291
These results should be viewed with trepidation given the small
sample size. The study also used one demographic in one locale, thus
lacking a true representation. These concerns aside, the results under-
mine anonymous juries. While anonymity was not a focus, the study
demonstrates that accountability influences the juror’s decision mak-
ing. A decision maker who is not held accountable behaves differently
from one who is. Having to justify their reasoning forced jurors to
better process the information. It also resulted in a fairer process.
Accountability and anonymity are connected. Jurors are indi-
rectly accountable for their decisions.292 The Public Trial Clause en-
genders accountability for jury verdicts.293 “Accountability to the
community is an important pressure on [jurors] to do the right
thing.”294 While juries are not accountable per se, media attention can
prompt jurors to rationalize their decision. Indeed, one commentator
contends that post-verdict juror interviews promote accountability in
the judicial process.295 “Mindful that reporters might ask them for
post-trial explanations, it has been suggested that jurors will respond
by paying more careful attention than they otherwise would to the
287. Id.
288. Id. at 290.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 289–90.
291. Id. at 286.
292. See Roderick M. Kramer et al., The Social Context of Negotiation: Effects of Social Iden-
tity and Interpersonal Accountability on Negotiator Decision Making, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 633,
638 (1993) (noting that “accountability activates self-presentational concerns because peo-
ple seek approval and status from the ‘audiences’ that observe their behavior”).
293. See Marvin Zalman & Maurisa Gates, Rethinking Venue in Light of the “Rodney King”
Case: An Interest Analysis, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 215, 238 (1993) (“a local juror in a small town
‘may indeed feel a sense of personal responsibility . . . that a resident of an urban area . . .
may not.’” (quoting Corona v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 411, 418 (Ct. App. 1972))).
294. Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in
Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 126–28 (1996).
295. Nicole B. Casarez, Examining the Evidence: Post-Verdict Interviews and the Jury System,
25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 499, 547 (2003).
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evidence and arguments.”296 Thus, public pressure is akin to account-
ability. But if the public does not know who the jurors are, jurors may
act less responsibly. Thus, juror accountability is thwarted by juror an-
onymity. An anonymous juror is just that. He is unknown to the me-
dia, and can thus avoid accountability.
Tetlock’s accountability study raises questions about anonymous
juries. Those held not accountable are more likely to vote guilty, a
frightening prospect for criminal defendants being tried by anony-
mous jurors. As Tetlock notes, “[d]emands for accountability not only
affect what people think; demands for accountability also affect how
people think.”297 Whether anonymous jurors are more prone to con-
vict and whether they take the role of juror less responsibly are two
questions at the heart of the anonymity issue. The Tetlock study an-
swers both in the affirmative.
In sum, accountability engenders more cognitive effort.298 When
subjects are told they will be interviewed about their decision, they
invest more cognitive energy.299 In psychological terms, concerns
about accountability lead people “to muster the additional cognitive
resources required for data-driven processes, utilizing those processes
rather than the schematic processes that are more prone to error.”300
These findings further undercut the case for anonymous juries.
296. Nancy S. Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures: A Study of Post-Verdict Interviews of
Jurors, 82 IOWA L. REV. 465, 499 (1997) (noting post-verdict interviews may encourage ju-
rors to be more responsible).
297. Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice: Toward a Social
Contingency Model, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 331, 342 (1992).
298. See Robert H. Ashton, Effects of Justification and a Mechanical Aid on Judgment Perform-
ance, 52 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 292, 301 (1992) (justifying
decisions creates “significant improvement in accuracy that can be traced in part to a sig-
nificant improvement in consistency”); Philip E. Tetlock, Linda Skitka & Richard Boettger,
Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolster-
ing, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 632, 633 (1989) (positing that people are cognitive
misers and responding to different forms of accountability takes effort); Elizabeth Weldon
& Gina M. Gargano, Cognitive Loafing: The Effects of Accountability and Shared Responsibility on
Cognitive Effort, 14 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 159, 160 (1988) (citing various studies
demonstrating that decision makers who know they are being held accountable use more
complex decision processes than those that do not).
299. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 273, at 255 (accountability encourages people to
give “compelling justifications” so that they may experience rewards); Philip E. Tetlock &
Jae Il Kim, Accountability and Judgment Processes in a Personality Prediction Task, 52 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 700, 700 (1987) (describing study showing subjects who are aware of
their accountability beforehand invest more effort in evaluations).
300. Ronald Chen & John Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Struc-
tures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1185 (2004) (citing JACQUES-PHILIPPE
LEYENS, VINCENT YZERBYT & GEORGES SCHADRON, STEREOTYPES AND SOCIAL COGNITION
135–37 (1994)).
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D. Correlating Anonymity with Other Security Measures
Courtroom security measures also provide insight on the psycho-
logical ramifications of anonymity. Social scientists have studied how
security impacts jurors. This subpart examines the effects of jury se-
questration and armed law enforcement officers on juries and extrap-
olates them to anonymity.
1. Jury Sequestration
Jury sequestration is the physical isolation of the jury from the
public and sequestration can be instituted for the trial or jury deliber-
ations.301 Common law principles governed sequestration, but now
statutory authority controls it.302 Courts use sequestration as a last re-
sort because it is a logistical nightmare, most detrimental to the se-
questered jurors who describe feelings of “imprisonment.”303
Social science provides minimal research on the effects of seques-
tration. This is understandable, given the difficulty in simulating such
conditions. Logistical barriers render mock sequestration impractica-
ble. One study compared sequestered and non-sequestered juries in
New York, revealing that sequestered juries produced sixteen percent
more convictions than non-sequestered juries.304 While the jurors
were not asked about their feelings on sequestration and whether it
affected their decision, these numbers are instructive because they in-
volved actual trials. This figure shows sequestered juries are more
prone to convict, although it did not account for differences in
evidence.
Hypotheses exist about the negative effects of sequestration on
criminal defendants. A juror may develop animosity towards the de-
fendant when he learns he cannot see his family.305 This predicament
may be attributed to the defendant and thus color the juror’s views.306
Another source of possible prejudice is the repeated contact between
301. James P. Levine, The Impact of Sequestration on Juries, 79 JUDICATURE 266 (1996).
302. Marcy Strauss, Sequestration, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 63, 70 (1996); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3432 (2006) (“[A] list of the veniremen and witnesses . . . need not be furnished if the
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that providing the list may jeopardize the
life or safety of any person.”).
303. See Mark Hansen, Sequestration: Little Used, Little Liked, 81 A.B.A. J. 16, 16-17 (Oct.
1995) (discussing the cons of sequestration). The jurors in the Simpson case spent more
time in confinement than the average criminal defendant in California. Id. at 16.
304. Charles Winick & Alexander B. Smith, Post Trial Sequestered Juries Tilt Toward Guilty
Verdicts, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 12, 1986, at 1.
305. See Strauss, supra note 302, at 115.
306. Id.
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jurors and law enforcement officials.307 Bailiffs, marshals, and sheriffs
are often the only outside contact jurors have during sequestration.308
Such an atmosphere may put the prosecution in a positive light.309
The study suggests that additional forms of security may result in
higher rates of guilty verdicts. Sequestration, like anonymity, is atypi-
cal. Jurors may think these security measures are needed to protect
them from the defendant. The subsequent step between dangerous-
ness and guilt is hard to resist.
2. Armed Security
The use of law enforcement officers is another court room secur-
ity measure. But the monitoring of criminal defendants by officers can
cause the jury to perceive the defendant as dangerous. Such a nega-
tive perception hampers the defendant’s right to a fair trial.310 The
Ninth Circuit has suggested that enhanced security measures could
impugn the presumption of innocence.311 The presence of armed law
enforcement officers raises concerns similar to anonymity. Each has
the potential to skewer the presumption of innocence by portraying
the defendant negatively. This is not to suggest officers should not be
present; their presence saves lives. This Part merely compares the ef-
fects of armed guards to that of anonymity.
In Holbrook v. Flynn,312 the U.S. Supreme Court considered
whether armed security in a courtroom violated a defendant’s right to
a fair trial. The defendant argued the guards’ close proximity to him
caused the jury to perceive him as guilty.313 The defendant cited a
study discussing the prejudicial effect of armed security.314 The Court
rejected the study and concluded that the guards’ presence was not so
prejudicial to violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.315
307. Id. at 114–15.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. But see Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572 (1986) (holding presence of security
guards in courtroom was not inherently prejudicial and did not hamper defendant’s right
to fair trial).
311. Morgan v. Aispuro, 946 F.2d 1462, 1464–65 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding the security
measures in this case were not inherently prejudicial but leaving open the possibility that
they may be in other cases).
312. 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
313. Id. at 562–63, 70.
314. Id. at 571 n.4 (citing Gary Fontaine & Rick Kiger, The Effects of Defendant Dress and
Supervision on Judgments of Simulated Jurors: An Exploratory Study, 2 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 63,
69–70 (1978)).
315. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 571.
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The study cited in Holbrook was conducted by scholars Gary Fon-
taine and Rick Kiger. It considered whether armed supervision of
criminal defendants influenced jurors.316 The study’s concerns were
the effects of supervision on pretrial custody and the ability to obtain
bail. The study also examined the effect of a defendant’s dress on ju-
rors.317 The subjects, college students, watched a fifty-minute video of
a simulated murder trial.318 The videotape presented the trial pro-
ceedings as it occurred, except when a witness testified, a still picture
of the defendant appeared on the monitor.319 The subjects were split
into different groups, each group watching different versions of the
same trial.320 Some subjects saw the defendant in personal dress (suit
and tie) while others saw institutional dress (jail shirt and pants).
Others saw the defendant either by himself or with an armed
guard.321 After viewing the trial, the subjects determined whether the
defendant was guilty of first-degree murder, second-degree murder,
or manslaughter.322
The Fontaine and Kiger experiment sought to determine
whether institutional dress and armed supervision led jurors to infer
that defendants were unable to post bail.323 While unrelated to juror
anonymity, the results are important. The researchers concluded the
subjects were cognizant of the armed guard, and the armed supervi-
sion led jurors to infer the defendant was unable to post bail.324 De-
fendants wearing personal dress with armed supervision and
defendants wearing institutional dress without supervision received
more severe verdicts.325 Armed supervision alone resulted in more se-
vere verdicts.326 However, those defendants with institutional dress
and armed security received lesser verdicts.327 The researchers attrib-
uted this to a “sympathy effect.”328 The study was conducted again, but
with subjects drawn from a voter registration list.329 The results were
316. Fontaine & Kiger, supra note 314, at 63.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 65.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 66.
323. Id. at 63.
324. Id. at 66.
325. Id. at 67.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 69.
329. Id. at 68.
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similar. Institutional dress with no supervision or personal dress with
supervision led to more severe verdicts.330 The defendant in institu-
tional dress with armed supervision again received more lenient
sentences.331
While the results are instructive, the study is not without flaws.
The subjects rendered their decisions individually. This method ig-
nores the effect of group deliberations on decision making, and
group deliberations could have minimized bias against the defendant.
Another weakness is that the trial was conducted via a video monitor.
Much is lost through a television screen, especially the presence of an
armed guard next to a criminal defendant. The repeated use of still
pictures made subjects more aware of the independent variables
(dress and supervision) than a subject might ordinarily be. These still
pictures forced subjects to stare at the defendant while a witness testi-
fied, likely affecting their mental processes. Also, the trial lasted only
fifty minutes. Actual trials can last for weeks, with jurors seeing the
defendant surrounded by armed security repeatedly. The prejudice
might wane as jurors became accustomed to the situation. Finally, the
study’s effects did not capture the true prejudice an actual juror might
have when armed security is present. While the study’s methods were
less time consuming and more cost effective, the prejudicial impact is
best determined through procedures mimicking real life.
E. Psychology and Anonymity
Many assumptions about the jury are psychological ones.332 Juror
bias is no exception. Whether anonymity prejudices a defendant’s
right to a fair trial is steeped in psychological considerations. Thus,
the legal system’s assumption that an anonymous juror remains neu-
tral and unbiased is challenged by social science. While social science
is not a panacea, it illuminates issues touching upon juror psychology.
Thus, courts should consider the impact of anonymity through the
prism of psychology.
The above studies do not prove beyond a doubt that anonymity’s
psychological impact harms defendants. But it is a starting point. The
findings do establish that anonymity leaves an imprint on a juror’s
psyche. The degree of this mark, even if minimal, cannot be ignored.
A defendant’s right to a fair trial is at stake, and courts have failed to
330. Id. at 69.
331. Id.
332. PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 2 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray, eds.,
1982).
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consider the psychological implications of anonymity. Examining psy-
chology in the context of anonymous juries may uncover intricate is-
sues otherwise safely interred. But it is the duty of courts to ensure the
presumption of innocence does not become an abstraction.
Conclusion
“An institution that has so long stood the trying tests of time and
experience, that has so long been guarded with scrupulous care, and
commanded the admiration of so many of the wise and good, justly
demands our jealous scrutiny when innovations are attempted to be
made upon it.”333 The jury has undergone changes in the last several
decades. Such results have dismantled jury fixtures, and anonymity is
no different. An axiom of the adversarial system is a neutral fact
finder. But if a defendant cannot ensure that neutrality, this tenet is
undermined. Psychological research instructs anonymity impacts juror
decision making, and not in a defendant’s favor. As anonymity is inim-
ical to the presumption of innocence, courts need to take a closer
look at anonymous juries.
333. Work v. State, 2 Ohio St. 296, 303 (1853).
